

An Empirical Comparison Of Nigeria's Foreign Policy And Economic Relations Under The Four Civilian Administrations Of The Fourth Republic, 1999-2018

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Abstract: It is not in doubt that the four civilian administrations of the Fourth Republic from 1999 to 2018 have made frantic efforts through the Nigeria's foreign policy and economic relations to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the country. However, all the four administrations of Obasanjo, Yar'adua, Jonathan and Buhari have underperformed where they failed to effectively utilize the country's foreign policy and economic relations towards re-directing all the attracted FDI and other foreign capital inflows (revenue sources) towards boosting Nigeria's industrial and manufacturing sectors/subsector of the domestic economy. This vital sector is the nascent moving global currency that has catapulted and is still sustaining the economy of the leading Group of Seven (G7) highly industrialized and developed economies of the world. The inability of the four civilian administrations to effectively utilize the attracted FDI for growing the industrial and manufacturing sector/subsector indicates underperformance of Nigeria's foreign policy and failure to support its economic relations instrument for moving the domestic economy away from overdependence on Oil & Gas. It is this underperformance and failure to direct all attracted FDI away from oil and gas as well as merchandize activities that motivated the study. As such, even when there are other purely qualitative means of conducting the comparative analysis, this study chose and adopted non-survey primary methods such as in-depth interviews and focus group discussion. Both the oral interviews and Focus Group Discussion were carried out in NIPSS, NIIA, MFA and FMIT&I in Jos and Abuja all in Nigeria. At the end recommendations were proffered towards directing all attracted FDI away from Oil and Gas (O&G) and merchandize activities to industrialization and manufacturing; which are the two vital sectors capable of moving Nigeria much more closer to her aspiration of being one of the 20 global economies by the year 2020.

Key Words: Foreign Policy, FDI, Economic Relations, Comparative, Industrialization, Manufacturing.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since her political independence in 1960, Nigeria's foreign policy through its economic relations instrument has been well utilized for marketing the country's products and goods to other countries. With the enthronement of civil democratic administration in Nigeria in 1999, the four successive civilian governments of Obasanjo, Yar'adua, Jonathan and Buhari have deployed the country's foreign policy and economic relations to effectively and efficiently relate with other sovereign states/international economic organizations in order to attract Foreign Direct Investment and other foreign capital. The essence of this is to expand her external revenue sources and increase her economic might; which serves as a barometer for measuring her status and assertiveness of sovereign independence in an increasingly interdependent comity of nations. It is therefore not in doubt that Nigeria's foreign policy over the years have not only been geared towards attracting FDI; but it has seen to the steady inflow of foreign capital including FDI to the country. The quality of foreign policies drawn largely from the domestic environment, when marched with the right political will; often situate a country on the right pedestal towards a goal-directed and reward-yielding conduct of economic relations for the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment. However, in spite of all the efforts of the four civilian administrations of the Fourth Republic in this direction, Nigeria's foreign policy underperformed where it failed to utilize its economic relations instrument towards boosting non-oil exports mostly from manufactured goods for the expansion of the country's foreign revenue sources. Consequently, the country's inability to effectively utilize its foreign policy instrument of economic relations for the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment that will make the economy manufacture-driven serves a great deterrence for attaining her aspirations of Vision 20 2020. This underperformance makes the analysis in this study imperative.

Aim And Objectives Of The Study

The major aim of the study is an empirical comparison of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and economic relations under the four civilian administrations of the Fourth Republic. The specific objectives of the study are as follows:

1. To assess how Nigeria's foreign policy through its economic relations instrument has affected the country's foreign revenue sources in the Fourth Republic.
2. To examine how each of the four civilian administration of the Fourth Republic has utilized Nigeria's foreign policy that attracted the inflow of foreign capital for growing the economy and for general development.
3. To determine how each of the civilian administrations has enhanced the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment that boosted industrialization and manufacturing in the Fourth Republic.

II. CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Two important concepts of foreign policy and economic relations as well as theories of comparative administration and interdependence have been defined and clarified as frameworks for the study below:

Foreign Policy –

Foreign policy has been defined by Kegly and Wittkopt (1993, p.44) as those goals that officials representing nation-states seek abroad, the values that underline these goals and the means/instruments used to pursue them. Useful as their views are, but they seem to limit foreign policy to the domain of public officials where critical inputs from the private sector and the citizens are shutout. A more simplistic definition by Northedge (1968) sees foreign policy as an inter-play between the outside and the inside. The definition suggests that foreign policy is a reaction to external stimuli while reflecting domestic realities. Iyan (1993, p.44) is of the view that foreign policy is mostly prosecuted for the protection of the national interests. These national interests according to him, constitutes such factors as economic and social wellbeing of citizens as well as security and integrity of the country. His view seems to fit the purpose of Nigeria's foreign policy and economic relations towards expanding the country's foreign revenue sources.

Economic Relations –

Economic relations has been broadly defined by Olusanya and Akindele (1986, p.11) as a critically important component, the heart and cobweb of a country's international pre-occupation, engagement and foreign policy transactions; where the guaranteeing of the economic wellbeing of a nation's citizens is the ultimate or hallmark of a successful public policy. They went on to add that, it is for this reason that great attention is usually being paid to external economic relations by government of most countries. Their views seem to bring clarity to the fact that economic relations is increasingly becoming the arrowhead of a nation's foreign policy; more especially in a mutually interdependent globalize world.

Comparative Administration Theory –

The first scholar behind the theory of comparative administration and government was Herbert Simon (1957) who came up with normative approach and empirical approach all aimed at making comparative analysis of administrations towards establishing whether they are performing efficiently or not. If not the areas of convergence and divergence among them will be sorted out and appropriate strategies adopted towards making them perform efficiently. Other scholars such as; Gabriel Almond (1988), Betarlanfy (1969), Billy J. Dudley, (1973, 1982) and Christopher Kolade (2000) were the exponents and advocates of comparative government and administration (politics). They placed emphasis on the political and administrative institutions, governance style and the rate of development. The comparison could either be inter-state (i.e. comparing the governance style or system between one country or the other), or intra-state (i.e. the comparative study of one regime/administration and the other within the same country). The last one is the focus of this study, which is the analysis of the performances of each administration in terms of Nigeria's foreign policy and economic relations from 1999 to 2018.

III. METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH DESIGN

The study is an empirical one where primary sources of data were utilized in generating data for the study. The research which is the study of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the Fourth Republic is essentially descriptive and explanatory.

POPULATION AND SAMPLE

Target Population


The population for the selection of sample for the study, which is 55, is drawn from top policymakers and researchers from Federal Ministries/Research Institutes saddled with the responsibility of executing Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment. Since the population is relatively large, only 13 respondents and discussants were selected as sample (representing ¼ and 24% of it); were engaged in both the indebt interviews and Focus Group Discussion (FGD). The balance of 42 of the target population representing ¾ or 76% were not engaged in the both the oral interviews and the FGD. The 13 respondents/discussants were made-up of experts and practicing diplomats directly involved in implementing/researching in Nigeria's foreign policy and economic relations. This is based on the fact that the study is professionally inclined, such that only those that are involved or highly knowledgeable can offer informed responses. This is as illustrated by Table 1 and Figures 1 to 3 below:

**Table 1:
Summary of Population and Percentage of In-depth Interviews and Focus Group Discussion**

<u>S/No.</u>		<u>Population</u>		<u>Percentage</u>
1.	Total target population	55		100%
2.	Respondents & Discussants		13	24%
3.	Balance	42		76%


Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2018

Figure 1: Target Population, Respondents & Discussants and Balance of Target Population



Sources: Generated by the Researcher in 2018 From Field Study


Figure 2: Numbers of Target Population, Respondents & Discussants and Balance of Target Population



Sources: Generated by the Researcher in 2018 from Field Study

The sample population of 13 respondents and discussants engaged in both the in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussion represents $\frac{1}{4}$ of the total target population of 55. Whereas the balance of 42 represents $\frac{3}{4}$ of the balance of the total target population of 55 that were not engaged. The percentage of the sample population of 13 represents 24% and that of the balance of 42 of the target population that were not engaged represents 76% are as illustrated in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: Percentage of Respondents & Discussants and Balance of the Target Population



Source: Generated by the Researcher in 2018 from Field Study

Sample

For the oral in-depth interviews, the sample size was four (4). Two Permanent Secretaries (2) or their representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Federal Ministry of Industries, Trade & Investment, as well as two (2) Directors General or their representatives from the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs were orally interviewed in generating primary data for the study.

For the Focus Group Discussion which was conducted at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) Kuru Jos, nine (9) top officials of the Institute comprising seven Senior Fellows of the Research and Academic departments, the Institute's Librarian and the Institute's Editor were engaged in the discussion.

Sampling Technique

The purposive sampling technique was adopted to handpick the top policy makers and 'think tanks' that were interviewed and the nine research fellows/think-tanks that were engaged in the interactive session. The choice of a small sample under the purposive sampling technique is because of the highly professional nature of the research whereby only those that were practically involved or highly knowledgeable in the field of Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment provided useful information.

SOURCES OF DATA

Primary source of data was adopted in generating data for the study. The justification for the choice of this source of data collection is given below under methods of data collection:

Primary Sources

Primary sources of data such as in-depth interviews and focus group discussion were adopted in generating data for the study. These were obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade & Investment (FMIT&I), National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA).

IV. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

The two methods of data collection adopted were in-depth interviews and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) as treated below:

In-depth Interviews (Qualitative Interviews)

The choice of the in-depth interviews in generating data for this study is based on the fact that one does not need to follow rigid and standardized form. This is in contrast to the standardized interviews under quantitative methods of the survey research where a carefully worded questionnaire is usually administered. The in-depth interview seeks to encourage free and open responses where there may be tradeoff between comprehensive coverage of topics and in-depth exploration of a more limited set of questions. It also encourages capturing respondents' perceptions in their own words, which is a very desirable strategy in data collection.

At the end of the structured interview, each of the respondents was required to score the performance of each administration under study based on the socio-economic indicators of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Foreign Direct Investment as contained in the guidelines for the one-on-one interface (interaction) of this study. The scoring was in accordance with the Ordinal Ranking scale as adapted from the World Bank of 2001. As a level of measurement, the Ordinal Level refers to variables with attributes we can logically rank in order. Examples include socio-economic status, level of conflict, prejudice, conservativeness, hardness, etc.

The scoring of the performances of each administration was ranked from ordinal number 1 to 7, where the ordinal number 1 represents excellent performance and the ordinal number 7 represents very bad performance. In the Ordinal Ranking for the study, 1 stands for excellent, 2 stands for very good, 3 stands for good, 4 stands for fair, 5 stands for slightly bad, 6 stands for bad performance and 7 stands for very bad performance. At the end, the scores of each of the respondents were added up by the researcher to arrive at the total scores of respondents (TSR) which was then divided by the actual number of respondents (NR) so far interviewed to arrive at the average score of respondents (ASR). It was the average score of all the respondents (ASR) that was used in preparing the tables and in plotting the graphs that served as the basis for the sequential systematic analysis.

The number of respondents (NR) interviewed which was represented by R4 is based on the fact that two Permanent Secretaries or their representatives and two Directors General of the MDAs mentioned above were labeled R1, R2, R3, and R4 respectively. Their individual scores for each of the socio-economic indicators was added up to arrive at the total scores (TSR) which was then divided by 4 to arrive at the average score (ASR). The adoption of the equation of TSR and ASR is based on the fact that they are necessary scientific tools

for the sequential systematic analysis of primary data in accordance with the Ordinal Ranking Scale of the World Bank of 2001.

For the purpose of illustration, the performance of Obasanjo's administration between 1999 and 2007 in terms of Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment that boosted investors' confidence in the country was taken as an example where it was calculated as given below:

Score of R1 = 2.5
Score of R2 = 2.0
Score of R3 = 3.0
Score of R4 = 3.0
Total Scores = 10.5
 $10.5 \div 4 = 2.6$ (ASR).

The average score of 2.6 in the above example which represents very good performance on the Ordinal Ranking scale, was the one used in preparing the frequency tables/graphs and for the sequential systematic analysis.

Focus Group Discussion

The adoption of the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) as a structured in-depth interview among multiple respondents in an interactive session was because the data obtained through interaction was focused on the subjective experiences of the discussants that have been exposed to the situation. It involved a semi-structured discussion on the topic of the study by a group of six to ten people. In essence, FGD enables researchers to gain insights into people's shared understandings of the issue under investigation. Here the researcher acted the role of a facilitator (moderator) and kept the discussion focused on the issue.

The FGD was held in a conference form where each discussant freely responded to the questions asked by the researcher. Guidelines of the areas where questions to be asked, were distributed to each of the discussants in advance to enable them prepare adequately for the session. To ensure that information from the FGD session were not lost; the researcher employed a research assistant that was concerned with video recording of the proceedings. The researcher himself manually recorded as much of the responses as possible. Once more, the scoring of the performance of each administration was in accordance with the Ordinal Ranking scale of the World Bank of 2001.

Therefore, each of the discussants in the FGD scored the performance of each of the administrations under study based on the socio-economic indicators of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Foreign Direct Investment as contained in the guidelines for the Focus Group Discussion. It was ranked from the highest ordinal number represented by 1 to the lowest ordinal number represented by 7. Just as in the in-depth interviews, the Ordinal Ranking for the FGD starts with ordinal number 1 which stands for excellent, 2 stands for very good, 3 stands for good, 4 stands for fair, 5 stands for slightly bad, 6 stands for bad and 7 stands for very bad performance. At the end, the scores of each of the discussants were added-up (summed up) in arriving at the Total Scores of all the Discussants (TSD). The TSD was divided by the Number of the Discussants (ND) to arrive at an Average performance Scores of all the Discussants (ASD) for each of the administrations under study which eventually served as the basis for the sequential systematic analysis.

For the purpose of illustration, the performance of Obasanjo's administration between 1999 and 2007 in terms of Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment that boosted investor confidence in the country was taken as an example where it was calculated as given below:

Score of D1 = 2.5
Score of D2 = 2.0
Score of D3 = 3.0
Score of D4 = 2.0
Score of D5 = 2.5
Score of D6 = 2.0
Score of D7 = 2.4
Score of D8 = 2.3
Score of D9 = 3.0
Total Scores = 21.7
 $21 \div 9 = 2.4$ (ASD).

The average score of the discussants which is 2.4 as in the above example represents a very good performance on the Ordinal Ranking scale was the one used in preparing the tables/graphs and for the sequential systematic analysis.

Method Of Data Analysis

The study utilized descriptive method of analysis. Data sourced through secondary sources such as document studies and published/unpublished materials were analyzed through the use of statistical tools such as content, thematic/discourse analysis and inference. This entails discussion and drawing inference from the data collected and the result presented in explanatory form. Qualitative data from the secondary sources with figures were presented in tabular and graphical forms. While, primary data sourced through in-depth interviews and the Focus Group Discussion (by the employment of Ordinal Ranking scale) were presented in tabular and graphical forms using sequential systematic analysis, where the data were analyzed in descriptive and explanatory form.

V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

The assessment of the performances of the four administrations in terms of Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through its economic relations instrument was carried out through the conduct of in-depth interviews as one of the two methods of data collection. The result is as presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 below, followed by the discussion.

Result Of In-Depth Interviews On Nigeria's Foreign Policy And Foreign Direct Investment In The Fourth Republic (1999-2015):

Result of the In-depth Interviews conducted separately at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru-Jos Nigeria; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja Nigeria; Nigeria Institute of International Affairs, Lagos/Abuja Nigeria and Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade & Investment, Abuja Nigeria is as presented in simple frequency Table 2 below:


Table 2: Frequency of Occurrence of Scores of Respondents on Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the Fourth Republic (1999-2017)

<u>Indices/Administrations</u>					<u>Respondents/Scores</u>						
R1	R2	R3	R4	TSR	ASR						
<u>Electricity/Energy (General)</u>					5.0	6.0	6.5	6.5	25.0	6.3	
Under Obasanjo					4.0	5.0	5.5	5.5	20.5	5.2	
Under Yar'adua					5.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	24.5	6.1	
Under Jonathan					6.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	25.5	6.4	
Under Buhari					3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	17.0	4.3	
<u>Quality of Staff (General)</u>					3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	15.2	3.8	
Under Obasanjo					3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	15.2	3.8	
Under Yar'adua					4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	16.0	4.0	
Under Jonathan					3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	15.6	3.9	
Under Buhari					3.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	13.5	3.4	
<u>Employment Generation (Gen)</u>					6.0	5.5	5.5	5.5	22.0	5.5	
Under Obasanjo					4.0	5.0	4.5	5.5	19.0	4.8	
Under Yar'adua					5.0	5.5	6.5	6.5	24.0	6.0	
Under Jonathan					6.0	6.0	6.5	6.5	25.0	6.3	
Under Buhari					3.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	13.5	3.4	
<u>Foreign Direct Investment (General)</u>					3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	12.0	3.0	
Under Obasanjo					3.0	4.5	3.5	4.5	16.0	4.0	
Under Yar'adua					4.0	4.0	3.5	3.0	15.0	3.8	
Under Jonathan					3.5	3.5	3.0	3.5	13.5	3.4	
Under Buhari					3.0	4.0	3.5	3.5	14.0	3.5	
<u>Security (General)</u>					3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	12.0	3.0	
Under Obasanjo					4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	16.0	4.0	
Under Yar'adua					4.0	4.5	3.5	3.5	15.0	3.8	
Under Jonathan					3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	14.0	3.5	
Under Buhari					3.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	13.0	3.3	
<u>Customs & Excise Services (General)</u>					3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	14.0	3.5	
Under Obasanjo					3.0	4.5	3.5	4.0	15.5	3.9	
Under Yar'adua					4.0	4.0	3.5	3.0	14.0	3.5	
Under Jonathan					3.5	4.5	3.5	3.5	15.0	3.8	
Under Buhari					3.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	13.0	3.3	
<u>Gross National Income (General)</u>					4.0	3.5	4.5	4.0	15.5	3.9	
Under Obasanjo					3.5	4.5	3.5	4.0	15.5	3.9	

Under Yar'adua	4.0	4.5	4.0	4.5	17.0	4.3	
Under Jonathan	4.0	4.5	4.0	4.5	17.0	4.3	
Under Buhari	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	12.0	3.0	
<u>Recovery of Looted Funds (General)</u>	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	12.0	3.0	
Under Obasanjo	3.0	3.8	3.8	3.8	15.2	3.8	
Under Yar'adua	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	16.0	4.0	
Under Jonathan	5.5	5.0	4.5	4.5	18.5	4.6	
Under Buhari	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.0	13.0	3.3	
<u>Home Remittances (General)</u>	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	14.0	3.5	
Under Obasanjo	3.0	4.5	3.5	4.0	16.0	4.0	
Under Yar'adua	3.0	4.5	4.0	4.5	17.0	4.3	
Under Jonathan	3.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	16.0	4.0	
Under Buhari	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	12.0	3.0	
<u>Judiciary (General)</u>	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	14.0	3.5	
Under Obasanjo	3.5	4.5	3.5	4.0	15.5	3.9	
Under Yar'adua	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	16.0	4.0	
Under Jonathan	5.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	18.0	4.5	
Under Buhari	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	13.5	3.4	
<u>Parliament (General)</u>	2.0	1.5	2.5	2.5	8.0	2.0	
Under Obasanjo	3.5	4.5	3.5	4.0	15.5	3.9	
Under Yar'adua	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	8.0	2.0	
Under Jonathan	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.0	14.0	3.5	
Under Buhari	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	14.0	3.5	
<u>Foreign Goodwill (General)</u>	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	12.0	3.0	
Under Obasanjo	2.0	4.5	3.5	3.5	15.0	3.8	
Under Yar'adua	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.5	13.5	3.4	
Under Jonathan	3.0	3.5	3.5	3.5	14.0	3.5	
Under Buhari	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	8.0	2.0	
<u>Poverty Eradication (General)</u>	5.0	4.5	5.0	5.5	20.0	5.0	
Under Obasanjo	4.0	4.5	4.0	4.5	17.0	4.3	
Under Yar'adua	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	19.0	4.8	
Under Jonathan	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	20.0	3.8	
Under Buhari	3.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	14.0	3.5	
<u>GDP Performance (General)</u>	2.0	2.5	2.5	1.0	8.0	2.0	
Under Obasanjo	2.0	3.0	2.5	3.0	10.5	2.6	
Under Yar'adua	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	11.5	2.9	
Under Jonathan	3.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	10.0	2.5	
Under Buhari	3.0	3.0	3.5	3.5	13.0	3.3	
<u>Export Performance (General)</u>	1.0	1.0	2.5	2.5	7.0	1.8	
Under Obasanjo	1.5	2.5	2.0	2.0	8.0	2.0	
Under Yar'adua	2.5	2.0	3.5	3.0	11.0	2.8	
Under Jonathan	2.0	2.0	2.0	3.0	9.0	2.3	
Under Buhari	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.5	8.5	2.1	
<u>Investor Confidence (General)</u>	3.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	8.0	2.0	
Under Obasanjo	2.5	2.0	3.0	2.0	9.5	2.4	
Under Yar'adua	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	11.0	2.8	
Under Jonathan	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	22.0	5.5	
Under Buhari	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.5	9.0	2.3	

Source: Generated by the Researcher from the result of In-depth interviews conducted in 2015

Figure 4: Performances of Sectors/Indices of the Economy as the Result of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the Fourth Republic from the Result of In-Depth Interviews.



Source: Researcher's Computation based on the Result of In-depth Interviews of 2015 using the World Bank Statistics Ordinal Ranking Scale of 2001

KEY 2: 1 = Excellent, 2 = Very Good, 3 = Good, 4 = Fair, 5 = Slightly Bad, 6 = Bad, 7 = Very Bad.

VI. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULT OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

Even though the in-depth interviews were conducted separately with the respondents in their individual offices, the result seems to indicate points of convergence on the issues raised concerning the performances of each administration of the Fourth Republic with regards to socio-economic indices/sectors as the result of Nigeria's foreign policy and foreign direct investment. The socio-economic indices/sectors are hereby sequentially discussed:

Electricity/energy:

From the statistics and graph above, the Electricity/Energy has remained a problematic sector for all the four administrations where the average score of the four respondents for general performance was 6.3. The performance of Buhari's administration is leading where it was rated 4.3.; Obasanjo's administration came second in terms of boosting the power/energy sector between 1999 and 2007 where respondents rated it 5.2 on

the Ordinal Scale. It was followed by the Jonathan's administration between 2010 and 2015, which was rated 6.4. Yar'adua's administration between 2007 and 2010 came last where it was rated 6.5. While lamenting on the poor performance of the energy/power sector, Respondent 1 (Muhammad-Bande, DG NIPSS) responded by asking whether performance of the energy sector can enhance revenue generation and mitigate domestic social problems. That many scholars have worked on the concept of progressive de-industrialization in Nigeria because of power failures. This according to him is based on the fact that we cannot run our industries and factories profitably with low power supply which is a disincentive to foreign investors. Nigeria's energy supply rose from mere 2,000 Mega Watts before May 29, 1999 to 4,000 MWs during Obasanjo's administration (1999 to 2007). While it dropped to 3,000 MWs during Jonathan's administration (2010 to 2015). The emergence of Buhari's administration in less than 100 days boosted power supply which has now risen to 5000 MWs; where it is expected to rise to 10,000 MWs in four years (Muhammad-Bande, 2015).

Respondent 1 (Muhammad-Bande, 2015), went further to state that during their study tour to Ghana, they interviewed some companies that relocated to that country from Nigeria. That one of the reasons these companies gave was the high cost of doing business in Nigeria because of poor energy supply. Ironically, the steady supply of electricity in Ghana is powered by gas imported from Nigeria. These same relocated companies manufacture goods in Ghana and export same to Nigeria. This, the DG maintains; gives Ghana upper hand through employment generation for her citizens and additional foreign exchange for that country. He also stated that it was the consensus of all that energy is Key to manufacturing and industrialization. This study is in full agreement with the position of Muhammad-Bande in this regard. It also aligned with the lamentation of Adaji (2009) where he stated that the current state of infrastructure more especially the energy and power sector is far from meeting the expectations of investors doing business in the Nigerian economy.

Quality of staff:

In spite of the efforts of the four civilian administrations of the Fourth Republic to re-organize and re-direct the human capital of Nigeria's foreign policy institutional machineries towards professionalization, yet there are still subsisting elements of the politicization of the system. This has been affirmed by Respondent 3 (Mr. Benny Adejinle – Director of Training, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Training Academy), who stated that even when the policy of the Ministry is that, those who failed the college examination should not be absorbed; yet because of politics, those who did not pass the college examination are absorbed. He equally revealed that most of the management staff that started work with the MFA in the late 1970s and early 1980s were actually university graduates; but not from political science and its branches. As such, they acquired diplomatic expertise on the job through experience and on-the-job training. The average score of the four respondents for their general performance was 3.8, Obasanjo was rated 3.8, Yar'adua 4.0, for Jonathan 3.9 and Buhari 3.0. This is an indication of good performance by the four civilian administration of the Fourth Republic. In spite of the good performance scored by the four respondents, Kwande (2012) stated that the dearth of experts and professionals as personnel manning our foreign embassies, high commissions and missions abroad; makes them to carry out actions with unintended consequences.

Employment Generation:

This is one of the leading socio-economic indicators that the administrations of the Fourth Republic could not properly address through Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment. The average score of the four respondents for their general performance was 5.5, which is an indication of slightly bad performance. Obasanjo's average score of 4.8 indicates a fair performance. Yar'adua's average score of 6.0 and Jonathan's average score of 6.3 all indicate bad performance and the inability of Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment to address the problems of unemployment in the country. The emergence of Buhari that brought high hopes towards sanitizing the system was rated 3.4 on the average by the four respondents. Respondent 1 (Muhammad-Bande), maintains that the rate of unemployment in the country which fluctuates between 17% and 30% is quite worrisome. According to him, a study conducted by NIPSS indicated that unemployment is the major source of insecurity in the country. This according to him is based on the fact that large proportion of youths in the society are unemployed which makes them more vulnerable to violent crimes or even insurgency. Hence, he stressed that all efforts to stem insurgency is a matter of urgency to reduce youth unemployment; which could be facilitated by a reward-yielding foreign policy through the economic relations instrument that will attract investors to set up businesses that will engage these youths. This agrees with the recommendations of Alli (2010) and Ogunsawo (2012) who separately suggested that the political leadership in the country should embark on realistic and pragmatic employment generation.

Foreign direct investment:

There is convergence in the separate views of the four respondents, which pointed to the fact that there was inflow of Foreign Direct Investment in the Fourth Republic. Respondent 4 (Barnabas Jatau – a Director in

the Ministry of Industry, Trade & Investment), specifically pointed out that the FDI drive of Obasanjo was very focused; with the power sector as a base to power the economy. He went on to add that Multi-national Companies (MNCs) for the period were ready to invest in the country because of the abundance of raw materials and cheap labour. In his comment on Jonathan's administration, Mr. Jatau maintains that FDI was not flowing because of security challenges, corruption and culture of impunity. This according to him, served as disincentives to foreign investors (Jatau, 2015). There was however consternation by some of the respondents such as; Wapmuk, Adejinle and Muhammad-Bande who lamented that in spite of the large numbers of foreign investors that flooded our economy, it was not commensurate with the attraction of foreign capital. This agrees with the reservations of Akinlo (2004) and Adelagan (2000) where their views pointed to the underperformance of FDI to expand Nigeria's foreign revenue sources. Nonetheless, the average score of the respondents for general performance was 3.0 indicating good performance on the Ordinal Scale. Muhammad-Bande stated that Obasanjo could have scored excellent if not for his third-term bid. Hence, his administration was rated 4.0. Yar'adua was rated 3.8, Jonathan 3.4 and Buhari 3.5. This study agrees with the reservations of the four respondents on the underperformance of FDI including low inflow of foreign capital from FDI and other foreign revenue sources. The study will like to state that it is a negation of the interdependence theory. This portrays the underperformance of Nigeria's foreign policy to support FDI towards reaping greater benefits/rewards for the country in her international interactions.

Security:

Another sector that performed so badly for all the four administrations is security where the average score of respondents for general performance was 6.3 on the Ordinal Scale. The average score of the four respondents for Obasanjo's administration was 5.0 on the Ordinal Scale. Even though Yar'adua's average score of 6.1 was not too impressive, yet it was he, who according to R1 adopted a methodological and open approach towards resolving the persistent Niger Delta security problems. In spite of his battle for life throughout his tenure, President Yar'adua has recorded modest achievement in dousing the militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta region by granting amnesty to all ex-militants. As he was resolving the Niger Delta militancy, the Boko Haram insurgency erupted during his administration on August 29, 2009. Jonathan's score of 6.3 indicated lack of serious commitment to security issues more especially Boko Haram insurgency of the North East region of the country. Respondent 1 (Prof Tijjani Muhammad-Bande who is the Director General of NIPSS) in his response lamented that "finger-pointing" led to the persistence of the insurgency in the country. The separate views of the four respondents concur on the fact that spiral of suicide bombings, kidnappings and ransom abductions all over the country throughout Jonathan's tenure actually scared away prospective investors from investing in the country. The international community according to Muhammad-Bande (2015) was waiting to see how Goodluck Jonathan's administration would solve all these complex security problems more especially in the last two years of his tenure. He went on to add that international business partners and economic organizations; which the country is a member of, such as; OPEC, D8, IMF, ECOWAS, etc; not only warned the Jonathan administration, but issued threat and counter-threats concerning their economic interests in Nigeria. Buhari's administration was rated 4.3 because of his doggedness and pro-active handling of security issues on assumption of power in May, 2015. The bad average score by the respondents for all the four civilian administrations is in line with the reservations of Omowunmi (2012) who stated insecurity is one of the factors that scares away foreign investors because they consider the domestic environment too risky to do business.

Customs & excise services:

Views of R1 to R4 seems to converge and point to the fact the Nigerian Customs and Excise is the agency concerned with import - export services in and out of the country. The views of the four respondents seem to agree that the Nigerian Custom & Excise is therefore an important agency through which a reward-yielding economic relation can be attained by the country for the attraction of more Foreign Direct Investment. Respondent 4 (Jatau, 2015) maintained that the Customs Services did not measure up in its task of encouraging the establishment of competitive local industries. That the NC&E did not do much at reducing tariffs on raw materials imported into the country for the production of goods that Nigeria has comparative competitive advantage in the international market. The average score of the general performances of the four administrations is 3.5, which is a good performance. Buhari came 1st where it was rated 3.3, Yar'adua occupied the 2nd position with 3.5 rating, Jonathan 3rd with 3.8 rating and Obasanjo in the 4th position where it was rated 3.9. This is anchored on the lamentation of Ashiru (2013) who pointed at inability of the Nigerian Customs & Excise to harmonize tariffs in line with ECOWAS potential custom union that will encourage inflows of foreign portfolio investment and FDI.

Gross national income:

The views of the four respondents seem to converge to the fact that there has been appreciable increase in the Gross National Income (GNI) throughout the Fourth Republic. Respondent 1 (Muhammad-Bande) and Respondent 3 (Mr. Adejinle) seem to share the same views where they stressed that most of the figures by relevant agencies technically show it arising from the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 6% to 7% for a long time. They went on to add that – the question to ask is that – how much has non-oil exports contributed to the GNI? In response to this question, bulk of the GNI is from revenue generated from the Oil and Gas (O & G) sector. The average score of the four respondents for general performance was 3.9, Obasanjo 3.9, Yar'adua 4.3 Jonathan 4.3 and Buhari 3.0. The views of the four respondents are in line with that of Awa (1993) who stated that Nigeria's foreign policy has failed in its role of increasing the country's Gross National Income more especially in the non-oil sector.

Recovery of looted funds:

All the four Respondents share almost similar views that the enthronement of civil democratic rule in Nigeria as from May 29, 1999; coupled with the domestic reforms initially started by President Olusegun Obasanjo (principally anti-graft war), created a clean domestic business environment. This made friendly countries and international development partners to collaborate with the country in retrieving and repatriating her looted funds. Respondents average score for general performance was 3.0 indicating good performance. Initially, the Obasanjo administration started quite well in this regard, but his third term bid lowered his average score to 3.8.; Yar'adua and Jonathan were rated 4.0 and 4.6 respectively because they derailed from the anti-corruption crusade earlier started by Obasanjo. The four respondents' average score for Buhari in this regard was 3.3 indicating good performance. It is highly likely that Buhari's performance score will improve if he continues with the tempo of anti-corruption war and of sanitizing the domestic environment. Respondent 2 (Wapmuk) stated that both Yar'adua and Jonathan did not only introduce the unpopular concept of 'plea bargain', but Jonathan made matters worse by letting-off the hook most of those arrested by Obasanjo on corruption charges; where he granted some of them 'Presidential pardon'. His major sponsor and chief campaigner for the 2015 election, who was the leader of the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) was one of the major beneficiaries of this corruption-shield. At that point, Nigeria's international friends and development partners became disillusioned and relaxed all efforts in retrieving and repatriating the country's looted funds because they will end up in the same conduit/vicious circle of corruption. Even though the views of the respondents agrees with those of Uya (1992), as well as Onyali & Okafor (2014), but these scholars lamented that the underperformance of domestic reforms and lack of political will by the political leadership in the country has adversely affected the recovery of looted funds from foreign countries.

Home remittances:

The average score of the four respondents for general performance was 3.5 indicating good performance. The average scores for the individual performance of each administration are; Obasanjo 4.0, Yar'adua 4.3 Jonathan 4.0 and Buhari 3.0. There is convergence in the separate views of the four respondents that pointed to a steady increase in the volume of home remittances inflow to Nigeria between 1999 and 2015. Respondent 1 (Muhammad-Bande, 2015) and Respondent 2 (Wapmuk) specifically stated that the contribution of Nigerians in the Diaspora has exponentially increased. This they attributed to direct engagement with Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization (NIDO) by successive civilian administrations of the Fourth Republic; which encourages them not only to repatriate parts of their incomes back home, but to actively invest in Nigeria's domestic economy. Home remittance is now the 4th largest source of foreign revenue for Nigeria. This active contribution of NIDO to Nigeria's economy has even created discussions in the policy circle as to whether to initiate a Bill for an Act to be passed for, the establishment of a 'Nigerian Diaspora Commission'. This view is in tandem with that of Uya (1992) who advocated that Nigeria's foreign policy and economic relations should among others seek to secure goodwill from traditional allies and new friendly nations to include home remittances.

Judiciary/courts:

The average score for general performance of the four administrations was 3.5. Obasanjo's administration was rated 3.9 on the average by the respondents where his domestic reforms of ensuring transparency and accountability in public life was made possible through the courts who expeditiously dispensed off cases brought before them by the EFCC/ICPC. Yar'adua was rated 4.2 which is not a good performance because his administration almost rubbished both the anti-graft agencies and the courts where most of the high profile 'public thieves' were led-off the hook through the introduction of 'plea bargain'. Jonathan was rated 4.5 because he did not only continue with the concept of 'plea bargain', but seriously eroded the autonomy of the Judiciary/Courts. This is in line with the views of Jerome and Ogunkoya (2004) who lamented

that deficiencies in the areas of corporate laws, rule of law and inefficient judiciary/courts have negatively affected FDI in the country. While, the respondents' average score for Buhari was 3.5, indicating a good performance.

Parliament:

The general performance of the four administrations in terms of their engagements with the National Assembly (Parliament) in the execution of Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment; was rated 2.0 on the average by the respondents. This indicates a very good performance. Yar'adua's administration performed very well and was rated 2.0 indicating very good performance; which is an inference that the citizens through their representatives in parliament have by proxy participated in Nigeria's foreign policy and FDI drive. Respondent 2 (Wapmuk, 2015) further affirmed this position that for the last one year of Yar'adua's tenure when he was absent on medical treatment abroad up to the point of his death in 2010; it was the National Assembly that held sway for the country because of the inability of a weak Vice President to act. Jonathan and Buhari were tied on the second position and rated 3.5 each. Obasanjo was rated 3.9. Obasanjo's poor performance in terms of involvement of the Parliament in Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment by inference is attributable to his personal idiosyncrasies and pedigree of not only been a combatant soldier, but having once served as a Military Head of State with unilateral predisposition. This not too good performance is line with reservation of Alli (2010) where he lamented on the subordinate status of the country's National Assembly that has underperformed in her statutory responsibility of contributing to the success of Nigeria's foreign policy in attracting FDI.

Foreign goodwill:

There is point of convergence among the views of the four respondents that during the tenure of Obasanjo and Buhari, there were avalanches of foreign goodwill to Nigeria because of the near stable domestic environment conducive for doing business. Whereas, lack of commitment to fighting corruption by Yar'adua and Jonathan, created doubt in our international business/development partners, which slows the inflow of foreign goodwill to the country. Respondents' average score for general performance was 3.0 indicating good performance. Obasanjo was rated 3.8 (could have been rated 'very good' if not for his tenure elongation bid). Yar'adua was rated 3.4, Jonathan 3.5 and Buhari 2.0. The views and scores of the respondents concurs with the positions of Moses et-al (2013) and Uya (1992) who stated that Nigeria's foreign policy has failed to support the inflow of foreign capital among which is foreign goodwill.

Poverty Eradication

The general performance of the four administrations in terms of poverty eradication was rated with an average score of 5.0. The respondents' average score for each administration are; Obasanjo 4.3, Yar'adua 4.8, Jonathan 5.0 and Buhari 3.5. Respondents seems to share the same views on Nigeria's over-reliance on oil as her major external revenue source that culminated in complacency in the country's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment where most of the attracted FDI were directed at the Oil & Gas sector. All these according to them made the political leadership to pay less attention to manufacturing which is a critical sector that is not only capable of expanding the country's sources of foreign revenue, but of engaging and economically empowering the citizens. When large proportions of the citizens are economically empowered, it will not only increase their purchasing powers, but it will have a trickle-down effect on their extended families. This will subsequently reduce the level of poverty in the society. The not so impressive performances of the four administrations as observed and recorded by the respondents agrees with the positions of Kaiser (2005) who lamented that the inability of government to eradicate poverty in the country is one of the major causes of instability that makes the domestic environment hostile for foreign investors to do business.

Gross domestic product:

The four administrations performed creditably well in terms of GDP where their average score for general performance was 2.0. Where Obasanjo was scored 2.6, Yar'adua was scored 2.9 and Jonathan was scored 2.5. However, respondents' separate views pointed to the fact that bulk of the GDP comes from oil revenue. Buhari was scored 3.5 where his low performance compared to his predecessors is based on the fact that as at the time the data was captured, his administration was battling with recession coupled with lack of statistical data at the disposal of the respondents. This makes it empirically difficult to gauge his GDP performance. Even though the GDP performance was scored high by the four administrations, Adelegan (2000) and Uhomobhi (2012) were of the views that Nigeria's foreign policy and FDI should be made to provide more and expanded sources of foreign revenue for the country.

Export performance:

The general performance of the four civilian administrations in terms of export was rated 1.8 on the Ordinal scale. This represents an excellent performance. Whereas, their individual performances which fall between 2.0 and 3.0 on the Ordinal scale; could be scored as very good on the average where Obasanjo led with 2.0, Buhari came second with 2.1, Jonathan came third with 2.3 and Yar'adua came last with 2.8. There is convergence in the views of the four respondents where they agreed that the "Export Expansion Grant" (EEG) scheme introduced by President Obasanjo between 1999 and 2007 was quite noble. The EEG was to reduce cost of doing business for manufacturers and industrialists through grants. This incentive was expected to boost the manufacturing of finished goods for export, which in turn is expected to expand Nigeria's sources of foreign revenue. It is for this reason and other domestic reforms that Obasanjo's administration earned an Average Score of 2.0 on the Ordinal Scale indicating a very good performance. In spite of the pro-active efforts initiated by Obasanjo, the main export commodity and the major external revenue earner for the country is still oil. Such that any slight disequilibrium to the global price of oil in the international market automatically affects Nigeria's economy. They also shared almost the same views that Nigeria's quest for a manufacture-driven economy will remain a mirage if domestic problems such as epileptic power supply, insecurity and corruption are not realistically addressed. Respondent 4 (Jatau, 2015) maintained that to attain all the above, administrations of the Fourth Republic came up with "Zero Oil Policy" under Nigeria Industrial Revolution Plan (NIRP) of the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment; which is aimed at making the Nigerian economy operate as if there is no oil. That is to say that the national economy should rely solely on non-oil exports to finance the country's national budget and improve the domestic economy. The NIRP is to make available incentives for sectors with comparative competitive advantage with emphasis on automobile, solid mineral (cement), sugar and cotton (textiles and garments). Pursuant to this, R4 (Jatau) revealed that Nigeria currently has attained 39.5 million metric tons production in cement; such that we do not have to import cement. Rather, our excess products of cement are currently being exported to West African countries. Jatau also commented on the lamentation of a Western European national whom he was travelling with in Port Harcourt; who saw the flaring of gas and described it as, "Nigeria burning Dollars" (Jatau, 2015). This indicates that gas can be converted into a veritable foreign revenue earner for the country. In spite of the impressive performances of the four administrations in terms of export, Ashiru (2013) observed that it was lopsided in favour of Oil and Gas (O&G).

Investor confidence:

The general performance of the four civil democratic administrations in terms of Investor Confidence (i.e. the attraction of investors to do business in Nigeria) was rated 2.0 by the respondents on the average. This by inference indicated an improvement in Nigeria's foreign policy towards the conduct of the country's economic relations for the attraction of more and genuine foreign investors. The average score of respondents for Obasanjo was 2.4, Yar'adua was cored 2.8, Jonathan was rated 5.5 and Buhari was rated 2.3. The slightly bad performance of Jonathan's administration in this regard is attributable to the culture of impunity and corruption in the country throughout his five years stay in office. It is from this unfortunate background that Buhari as President-elect was immediately invited by our international business partners to attend a very high international economic forum such as the G7. Respondent 1 (Muhammad Bande, 2015), stress that it could therefore be hypothesized that all these efforts by the international community is to encourage and support the new administration of Buhari to sanitize the system and create a Clean Business Environment (CBE) that will bring 'genuine' investors rather than those that are part of the problem (Muhammad-Bande, 2015). This study agree with R 1 (Muhammad-Bande) and would like to add that the attracted genuine investors should invest more in the industrial and manufacturing sector/sub-sector of the Nigerian economy for the local manufacture of unique goods and products for export.

VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

The assessment of the performances of the three administrations in terms of Nigeria's foreign policy and foreign direct investment was carried out through the conduct of a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru-Jos. Nine Senior Fellows and Academics of the Research Department/Library of the Institute were engaged in the FGD. Characteristics of the nine discussants shows that eight (8) out of them have their ages ranging between 40 and 60 years with over twenty (20) years of functional work experience. Only one discussant falls within the range of 20–39 years of age with less than one year of working experience. Two out of the eight long serving staff are Professors, four are PhD holders in relevant fields and two are PhD students. Even the only relatively inexperienced Discussant has first degree and two Masters Degrees one of which is in international law. The high quality of the discussants is a reflection of the quality of the data and the credibility of the result.

Discussants were designated or labeled D1 up to D9 where their - Individual Scores (IS), Total Scores (TS) and Average Scores (AS) based on "Ordinal Scale" were recorded. The Total Scores of Discussants (TSD)

was divided by the number of discussants (ND) to arrive at the Average Scores of Discussants (ASD), which was used in plotting the graph Figure 5. The interactive session and the scoring were focused on socio-economic indices of Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment for the period of the study where the data obtained is presented in a simple frequency in Table 3 below.

Result Of Focus Group Discussion On Nigeria's Foreign Policy And Foreign Direct Investment In The Fourth Republic (1999-2014)

Result of the Focus Group Discussion conducted at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies Kuru-Jos is as presented in simple frequency Table 3 below:


Table 3: Frequency of Occurrence of Scores of Discussants on Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the Fourth Republic (1999-2014)

<u>Indices/Administrations</u>	<u>Discussants/Scores</u>										
	D1	D2	D3	D4	D5	D6	D7	D8	D9	TSD	ASD
<u>Gross Domestic Product (General)</u>	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	2	26	2.9
Obasanjo	2	3	3	2	2	3	2	3	3	23	2.6
Yar'adua	2	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	28	3.1
Jonathan	2	3	3	3	3	3	2	4	3	26	2.9
<u>Treaties/MoUs (General)</u>	2	3	2	2	4	3	3	4	3	26	2.9
Obasanjo	1	3	3	2	2	3	3	4	1	22	2.4
Yar'adua	2	3	3	2	1	3	3	4	2	23	2.6
Jonathan	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	4	2	24	2.7
<u>Parliamentary Oversight(General)</u>	2	3	3	2.5	4	4	3	3	4	28.5	3.2
Obasanjo	3	2	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	24	2.7
Yar'adua	3	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	25	2.8
Jonathan	2	3	3	2.5	3	4	3	4	4	28.5	3.1
<u>Delegation of Power (General)</u>	1	6	2	3	3	2	3	3	7	30	3.3
Obasanjo	1	6	3	3	3	3	3	3	7	32	3.5
Yar'adua	1	3	3	2	2	3	3	4	2	23	2.5
Jonathan	1	6	3	3	4	2	3	4	7	33	3.6
<u>Quality of Staff (General)</u>	2	6	3	3	3	4	2	4	7	34	3.8
Obasanjo	2	6	3	3	3	4	2	4	7	34	3.8
Yar'adua	1	6	3	3	3	4	3	4	7	34	3.8
Jonathan	2	6	3	3	3	4	2	4	7	34	3.8
<u>Security (General)</u>	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	6	38	4.2
Obasanjo	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	36	4.0
Yar'adua	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	36	4.0
Jonathan	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	54	6.0
<u>Per Capita Income (General)</u>	2	5	3	3	2	3	2	4	7	31	3.4
Obasanjo	2	2	3	4	3	4	3	4	3	28	3.1
Yar'adua	2	6	4	4	3	4	3	4	7	37	4.1
Jonathan	2	6	4	3	3	4	3	4	7	36	4.0
<u>Recovered Looted Funds (Gen)</u>	2	3	4	2	2	3	2	4	2	24	2.7
Obasanjo	2	3	4	2	2	3	4	4	2	26	2.9
Yar'adua	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	29	3.2
Jonathan	2	3	3	3	2	3	3	4	3	26	2.9
<u>Foreign Goodwill (General)</u>	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	1	26	2.9
Obasanjo	1	3	3	2	2	3	3	4	1	22	2.4
Yar'adua	2	3	3	2	1	3	3	4	2	23	2.6
Jonathan	2	3	3	2	3	3	3	4	2	24	2.7
<u>Foreign Direct Investment (Gen)</u>	2	2	3	2	3	3	3	4	3	25	2.8
Obasanjo	2	3	2	2	4	3	3	4	3	26	2.9
Yar'adua	1	3	4	2	4	3	2	4	3	26	2.9
Jonathan	2	3	4	2	3	3	3	4	3	27	3.0
<u>Employment Generation (Gen)</u>	2	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	4	29	3.2
Obasanjo	2	3	3	2	2	3	4	3	4	26	2.9
Yar'adua	2	3	3	2.5	3	4	3	3	4	27.5	3.1

Jonathan	2	3	3	2.5	3	3	3	4	4	27.5	3.1
Poverty Eradication (General)	5	6	6	5	5	6	6	6	5	50	5.6
Obasanjo	5	5	5	6	6	5	5	6	5	48	5.3
Yar'adua	6	5	6	6	6	6	5	6	6	52	5.8
Jonathan	6	6	5	6	5	6	5	5	6	50	5.6
Home Remittances (General)	2	3	3	3	4	2	3	4	2	26	2.9
Obasanjo	1	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	26	2.9
Yar'adua	2	3	4	3	3	3	2	4	2	26	2.9
Jonathan	2	3	3	2	3	3	2	4	2	24	2.7
Non-Oil Export (General)	2	6	3	4	3	3	4	3	5	30	3.3
Obasanjo	2	5	3	3	2	3	2	3	7	30	3.3
Yar'adua	2	5	3	3	3	4	3	4	7	34	3.8
Jonathan	2	5	3	3	3	4	2	4	7	33	3.7
Energy Supply (General)	6	6	6	6	4	4	5	5	6	48	5.3
Obasanjo	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	49	5.4
Yar'adua	6	6	6	6	5	5	6	6	6	52	5.8
Jonathan	6	6	6	5	5	5	6	6	6	51	5.7

Source: Generated by the researcher from the result of Focus Group Discussion conducted in 2014 as adapted from World Bank Ordinal Ranking Scale, 2001

Figure 5: Performances of Sectors/Indices of the Economy as the Result of Nigeria's Foreign Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the Fourth Republic (1999-2014) from the Result of Focus Group Discussion held at NIPSS, Kuru-Jos



Source: Researcher's Computation based on the Result of Focus Group Discussion conducted at NIPSS using the World Bank Statistics Ordinal Ranking Scale of 2001

KEY 2: 1 = Excellent, 2 = Very Good; 3 = Good, 4 = Fair performance, 5 = Slightly Bad, 6 = Bad, 7 = Very Bad.

VIII. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULT OF THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION

The result of the Focus Group Discussion as presented in the frequency Table 3 and the graph in Figure 5 above was so fascinating in the sense that it indicated unanimity in the scores of the nine discussants. The average scores and views of the nine discussants on the socio-economic indices/sectors are as discussed in sequence below:

Gross domestic product:

Discussants agreed that the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has tremendously increased between 1999 and 2014 following the remarkable improvement in Nigeria's standing (good external image) in the international environment and of her re-admittance into the comity of nations. They however maintained that revenue from oil forms bulk of the GDP, compared to the very low contribution of the non-oil for the period of the study. Their average score for general performance was 2.0; Obasanjo was scored 2.6; Yar'adua was scored 3.1 and Jonathan was scored 2.9. Yar'adua's low performance in this regard has been attributed to his ill health. The scores of the discussants agrees with the views of Nwoke (2009) and Akwada (2009) who separately appreciated the performance of the GDP in the Fourth Republic; but lamented that bulk of it was from the Oil & Gas sector.

Treaties/MoUs:

On the involvement of the Legislature in passing Treaties (Agreements and MoUs) entered into between Nigeria and foreign countries, Discussants unanimously agreed that the performance of the Legislature was very good between 1999 and 2014. Their average scores in this regard are; general 2.9, Obasanjo 2.4, Yar'adua 2.6 and Jonathan 2.7. In view of this, the increasing involvement of the legislative branch (which is composed of professionals and experts in different fields of endeavours) will go a long way to further improve the quality of the country's foreign policy. This will in turn, engender the good conduct of a goal-directed and reward-yielding economic relations for the attraction of more Foreign Direct Investment. More so, when these Treaties/MoUs; are ratified and implemented to the letter. This agrees with the views of Awolusi (2013)

Parliamentary (legislative) oversight:

On Parliamentary (Legislative) Oversight in Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment, Discussants agreed that there has been synergy between the National Assembly and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) for the period of the study through either public hearings or direct visits to the ministry by relevant committees of the National Assembly. Their average scores in this regard are; general performance 3.2, Obasanjo 2.7, Yar'adua 2.8 and Jonathan 3.2. This indicated an overall good performance by the three administrations of the Fourth Republic (1999-2014). The overall good performance recorded by the discussants is in line with the views of Ogunsawo (2012) where he appreciated the parliamentary performance in the Fourth Republic; but recommended for the entrenchment of a virile democracy that will sustain it.

Judiciary:

Discussants were unanimous in stating that the general performance of the Judiciary between 1999 and 2014 was good. Discussants were also unanimous that the Judiciary has performed good on the average in terms of interpreting relevant laws that has do with Foreign Direct Investment between 1999 and 2014. The average scores of discussants are; general performance 3.3, Obasanjo 3.5, Yar'adua 2.5 and Jonathan 3.6. Discussants attributed Yar'adua's outstanding performance in this regard to his protracted ill health which made the courts under the supervision of a powerful national assembly during Yar'adua's absence on medical vacation to speedily dispense of cases that affects the interest of the country. In spite of a near good performance recorded by the discussants for the judiciary/courts in the Fourth Republic; Omowunmi (2012) lamented that the judiciary and courts with weak laws have not been expediently and promptly dispensing cases bordering on corruption and looting of public resources. This according to her makes the domestic economy as a high-risk market for investment.

Delegation of powers and free flow of information:

Discussants were unanimous in stating that the general performance of the Institutional Machineries (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign Embassies & High Commissions and inter-ministerial collaboration with the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade & Investment), has improved between 1999 and 2014. Discussants were also unanimous that there has been steady improvement in the delegation of powers and free flow of information within the levels of Nigeria's foreign policy making and the conduct of economic

relations for the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment between 1999 and 2014. The discussants' average scores are; general performance 3.3, Obasanjo 3.5, Yar'adua 2.5 and Jonathan 3.6. Discussants attributed Yar'adua's outstanding performance in this regard to his protracted ill health, which made foreign policy managers and our diplomats in foreign offices have free hands in taking decisions even on critical matters that affects the country's national interests (Uhomioibhi 2012).

Quality of staff

Still within the Institutional Machineries, the average scores of the nine discussants in respect of Quality of Staff are; general performance 3.8, Obasanjo 3.5, Yar'adua 3.7 and Jonathan 3.6. Discussants also agreed that Jonathan's administration has introduced measures geared towards improving the quality of staff. One of which is his "36+1" initiative where best university graduates with relevant qualifications are employed into the MFA with one each from the 36 States plus the FCT-Abuja (i.e. 36+1). Another measure introduced by Jonathan was that of the professionalization of the foreign policy machineries where fifty six (56) career diplomats were appointed as Ambassadors out of eighty eight (88) in March, 2012; and the remaining thirty two (32) were non-career diplomats. In spite of this feat by Jonathan, his score is still the same with his two predecessors because of his administration's poor handling of the anti-corruption war. The scores of the discussants did not tally with the views of scholars such as Uhomioibhi (2012), Ajaebili (2011), Ogunsawo (2012) who maintain that the quality of staff/personnel in our embassies/missions abroad still need to be improved upon.

Security:

With regard to the performance of the three administrations in the Security sector, there is convergence in the views of discussants where they maintain that the country between 1999 and 2014 has witnessed one form of insecurity or the other. This insecure condition ranges from youth restiveness (militancy) in the Niger Delta region and Ransom abductions in the South East; to Boko Haram insurgency in the North (with origin in the North East). Discussants agreed that this less stable socio-political domestic condition has actually impacted negatively on investor confidence where some were scared from investing in the country. In view of this, the discussants' average score for the general performance of the three administrations between 1999 and 2014 was 4.2. The individual average scores of each administration's performance are; Obasanjo 4.3, Yar'adua 4.0 and Jonathan 6.0. The overall unimpressive performance of the security sector as scored by the discussants agrees with the views of Alli (2010), NPC (2012), Adebajo & Mustapha (2008) who lamented on the level of insecurity and instability in the country which according to them serves as very serious disincentive to foreign investors.

Per capita income:

The average scores for Per Capita Income are; general performance 3.4, Obasanjo 3.1, Yar'adua 4.1, Jonathan 4.0. Discussants agreed that the remarkable increase in the Per Capita Income of Nigerian citizens for the period under study (1999-2014) was founded on the favourable investment climate in the country enjoyed more especially in the Niger Delta region which is the fountain of the country's external revenue earnings. Yar'adua's amnesty programme has helped in defusing tension in the Niger Delta Region that made the domestic environment conducive for doing business. Major oil companies and businesses that were hitherto closed were re-opened after the amnesty. New foreign investors also started coming to invest in the country. This made our youths to be actively engaged in productive sectors of the economy with the corresponding economic empowerment and the increase in their purchasing power. This agrees with the views of Adeleke et-al (2014).

Gross national income:

The average scores for Gross National Income are; general performance 3.4, Obasanjo 3.1, Yar'adua 4.1, Jonathan 4.0. Discussants agreed that the remarkable increase in the Gross National Income of Nigeria and per capita income of the citizens for the period under study (1999-2014) was founded on the favourable investment climate in the country more especially in the Niger Delta region which is the fountain of the country's external revenue earnings. Yar'adua's amnesty programme has helped in defusing tension in the Niger Delta Region that made the domestic environment conducive for doing business. This made major oil companies and investors that have the country to return and continue with their businesses after the amnesty. New foreign investors also started coming to invest in the country. This acted as a soaping sponge that mopped our unemployed youths off the streets. In spite of the faire scores given to this sector, Awa (1993) and Onyali & Okafor (2014) in their separate views observed that it has underperformed and much need to be done towards improving the country's GNI on a sustainable basis.

Recovered looted funds:

The average scores by the discussants for Recovered Looted Funds were based on the strong collaboration with friendly countries and international business partners. Hence, the Discussants' average scores for Recovered Looted Funds are; general performance 2.7, Obasanjo 2.9, Yar'adua 3.2 and Jonathan 2.9. Even though Yar'adua fared well in terms of defusing the security threat in the Niger Delta region, which is the melting pot of the country's economy through the granting of amnesty to the militants of that region, yet his administration was largely found lacking in key domestic policies such as the anti-graft war. His administration rubbished the successful anti-graft war started by his predecessor – Obasanjo that boosted investor confidence in the country; where he (Yar'adua) introduced the unpopular concept of "plea bargain". His administration's poor handling of the James Ibori case who was discharged and acquitted by Nigerian courts on huge corruption charges; and who was eventually convicted by a British court for the same offence, pointed to the loose ends of his administration. This discourages friendly countries and international business partners from assisting the country in recovering looted funds because they believe that further repatriation of looted funds will still be re-looted in the vicious circle of institutionalized corruption. Even when the discussants have scored this area well, they however expressed skepticism on the sincerity of the political leadership in transparently disbursing all recovered looted funds. Their views are in line with the views of Pine (2011) who lamented that the persistent corruption in the country serves as a strong deterrent to friendly foreign countries that ought to assist us in the continuous process of the recovery of the country's looted funds.

Foreign goodwill:

As a follow-up to the laundered global image of Nigeria, the discussants collectively agreed that it has boosted foreign goodwill where international business partners and the World Bank greatly assisted Nigeria in cash and in kind for developmental purposes. Their average score for general performance was 2.9, where they rated Obasanjo 2.4, Yar'adua was rated 2.6 and Jonathan was rated 2.7. Their responses and scores that indicated good performance which is at variance with the views of scholars like Uya (1992) and Pine (2011) who maintain that if the anti-corruption war in the country is not prosecuted with sincerity of purpose, it will serve as a wedge for the inflow of foreign goodwill into the country.

Foreign direct investment:

On the inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the country through Nigeria's foreign policy and the conduct of her economic relations, the average score of the nine discussants for general performance between 1999 and 2014 was 2.8, which on the "Ordinal Scale" represent very good performance. According to the discussants, the very good performance in terms of FDI inflow to the country through Nigeria's foreign policy and its economic relations instrument is attributable to very high numbers of diplomatic visits undertaken by the three civilian Presidents to foreign countries to launder the image of the country. These high profile visits by the country's political leadership have boosted investor confidence where investors were assured that Nigeria's domestic environment is quite suitable for doing business. With the highest number of foreign visits by President Obasanjo, his administration was scored 2.9 on the average which is within the range of very good performance. Having emerged from a prolonged period of foreign policy underperformance and downgraded external relations, Obasanjo had to create a public space for domestic reforms in order to win international credibility for his government and for the re-integration of the country into the "Comity of Nations". Discussants agreed that Obasanjo's administration would have scored between 1 (Excellent performance) and 2 (Very Good performance) if not for his tenure elongation bid. The performance of Yar'adua's administration in terms of inflow of FDI was scored 2.9, which could be attributed to his ill health. While under Jonathan, the FDI performance dropped to 3.0 largely because of his poor handling of corruption and security issues, which deterred foreign investors from coming to invest in the country. The responses and scores of discussants agree with the views of scholars like Omowunmi (2012) and Adelegan (2000), who appreciated the level of FDI inflow to the country.

Employment Generation:

As one of the very strong socio-economic indicators for gauging the performance of Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment, employment generation in the views of the discussants has remained problematic. This is in spite of several measures (Poverty Alleviation Programme [PAP], National Poverty Eradication Programme [NAPEP], Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria [SMEDAN], Subsidy Re-investment and Empowerment Programme [SURE-P], etc.) introduced by the three civilian administrations to minimize unemployment in the country. Discussants' average scores are; general performance was rated 3.2, Obasanjo was scored 2.9, while Yar'adua and Jonathan were scored 3.1 each. Discussants unanimously agreed that Obasanjo's leading performance was anchored on his domestic reforms; like anti-graft wars, security upgrade, transparency, due process and the introduction of economic empowerment

programmes listed above where many jobless youths were engaged in productive sectors of the economy. The views and scores of discussants that rated performances of the three administrations of the Fourth Republic as good does not seem to agree with views of Akinterinwa (2012) and Alli (2010). The two scholars argues that in spite of the modest achievement of the three administrations in the area of employment generation, unemployment still persists; which they believe is the building bloc of conflicts and of general insecurity in the country; which deters genuine foreign investors.

Poverty eradication:

On whether Nigeria's foreign policy and Foreign Direct Investment for the period under study has led to poverty eradication, the average score for the general performance was 5.6; which falls within the range of slightly bad performance on the "Ordinal Scale". While the performance of the individual administrations in this regard shows that Obasanjo is leading with 5.3 (slightly bad performance), followed by Jonathan with 5.6 (slightly bad performance) and Yar'adua followed closely with 5.8 (slightly bad performance). Discussants unanimously agreed that even though the civil democratic administrations of the Fourth Republic have introduced policies, programmes and measures aimed at alleviating poverty in the country, the masses still live in abject poverty. While, a robust middle-class and a few extremely rich class, have been created. That it is these last two classes that highjacked the enormous resources of the greater number for their selfish interests. The poor scores recorded by discussants in the area of poverty eradication agrees with the views of Adebajo & Mustapha (2008), Alli (2010) and Kaiser (2005) whose separate views indicates that poverty is still a problem that is contributing towards making the domestic environment scary for foreign investors. This according to them is hinged on the fact that the poor who are in the majority can easily be manipulated by disgruntled politicians to cause crisis in the country.

Home remittances:

There is convergence in the views of discussants where they agreed that there has been active engagement of the three administrations in the Fourth Republic with Nigerians in the Diaspora (NIDO). This they did through the proactive foreign policy instrument of 'Citizens Diplomacy' (where Nigeria's foreign policy and external relations is geared more towards protecting the interests of Nigerians in the Diaspora and catering for their welfares). This gives Nigerians working abroad greater protection and the feeling of being recognized and cared for by their home government. The general performance of the three civilian administrations between 1999 and 2014 in terms of Home Remittances was scored 2.9 on the average indicating a very good performance. Since Nigeria had not experienced change of government from one political party to another as at the point the Focus Group Discussion was conducted (2014), this has greatly aided in the consistency in foreign policy principles in this regard. On the specific performance of each administration, Jonathan's administration came first with an average score of 2.7, which falls within the range of very good performance. Both the administrations of Obasanjo and Yar'adua tied on the second position with average scores of 2.9 each. The responses and scores of discussants on home remittances seem not to align with the views of Wafure & Nurudeen (2010), Moses et-al (2013), Migration Policy Institute Report (2013, 2016) and Osinbajo (2015). These and stakeholders and scholars/institute strongly believe that home remittances is increasingly becoming a very important source of foreign revenue to Nigeria.

Non-oil export:

On the performance of the three administrations with regard to non-oil export, eight of the nine discussants scored them between 3 and 4 with an average of 3.0 for the general performance. The ninth discussant's score for general performance was 5.0 and individual scores of each administration are; Obasanjo 7.0, Yar'adua 6.5, Jonathan 7.0. Since petroleum oil was the main source of the country's foreign revenue earner between 1999 and 2014 (as exemplified by the downward review of the annual national budget twice in 2014); the study concurs with the views of the ninth discussant who maintained that non-oil export is still far from being realized in Nigeria. The very bad performance recorded by discussants for non-oil export agrees with the views of Ashiru (2013) and World Bank Development Index (2013) which stated that the Nigeria's export is largely dependent on Oil and Gas with 75%; while the non-oil export is lagging behind with 25% (out which 2% goes to manufacturing). This is not healthy for the country's aspiration of being one of the 20 biggest economies of the world by the year 2020.

Energy/power supply:

There was convergence in the views of the nine discussants on energy and power supply in the country between 1999 and 2014 where they described it as the 'weeping child' of all vital sectors of the economy. Their lamentations are based on the fact that in spite of the devotion of huge chunk of the national budget to that sector by the three civilian administrations; electricity supply has remained epileptic and problematic.

Discussants agreed that lack of steady and regular power supply increases cost of doing business in the country. This they believed did serve as a great disincentive to investors more especially foreign investors. Their oral views tallied with their scores as follows: general performance 5.3, Obasanjo 5.4, Yar'adua 5.8, Jonathan 5.7. This represents slightly bad performance for all the three administrations. The underperformance of the electricity/energy sector in the Fourth Republic as recorded by the discussants is in agreement with the views of Ogunsawo (2012) and the National Population Commission (2012) who lamented on the poor supply of electricity and argues that it has scared away investors who subsequently relocated to some neighbouring West African countries.

IX. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

From the comparative analysis of the empirical data so far, conclusion can be drawn that Nigeria's foreign policy for all the four administrations of the fourth republic have underperformed where it failed to support its economic relations instrument in attracting and directing FDI and other foreign revenue sources to the industrial and manufacturing sector and subsector of the economy. Results from responses and scores of respondents/discussants in accordance with the ordinal ranking scale of the World Bank, 2001; established that FDI and other foreign capital inflows; have been attracted in the Fourth Republic. The study has further established that bulk of the attracted FDI was directed to the oil and gas sector; indicating negative performance by all the four civilian administrations from Obasanjo (1999) to Buhari (2015) for their inability to utilize the attracted FDI in making the domestic economy manufacture-driven. This is based on the fact that a manufacture-driven economy is not only a vogue, but a very vital global requirement for serious countries that aspires to be one of the leading apex global economies in the nascent international system. In addition, a manufacture -driven economy not only serve as a strong anchor for employment generation as well as economic empowerment for citizens; but also as a serious antidote for dousing tensions and agitations as well as eliminating all elements of insecurity in the country. Therefore, this study recommends that henceforth Nigeria's foreign policy and economic relations should be directed more towards attracting and directing all FDI and other foreign revenue sources at boosting the industrial and manufacturing sector/subsector of the economy through the manufacture of unique exportable goods with comparative competitive advantage in the international market. This when vigorously pursued on a sustainable basis would extricate the country from her jinxed position of overdependence on exhaustible and unpredictable Oil and Gas as a major foreign revenue source.

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